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The Resurrection of the Dodo:
The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the Puffery
Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions
JENNIFER O'HARE*
The conventional wisdom is that the puffery defense is inapplicable in
securities regulation. However, appellate courts in almost every federal circuit have
recently used the puffery defense to dismiss private securities fraud actions that
were based on vague statements ofcorporate optimism. This Article demonstrates
that the courts have misused the puffery defense and have improperly insulated
companies from liability for their misrepresentations. It contends that the
assumptions justifying the use of the puffery defense are not present in securities
transactions and that the federal securities laws have expressly rejected the very
doctrine underlying the puffery defense-caveat emptor. Arguing that the courts
have erroneously substituted the puffery defense for afull materiality analysis, this
Article offers a framework for addressing the materiality of vague statements of
corporate optimism.
I. INTRODUCTION
The leading securities regulation treatise boldly declares that the puffery
defense "has all but gone the way of the dodo."' However, recent cases 2
demonstrate that the puffery defense is alive and well and being used-and often
misused-by federal courts to dismiss private securities fraud actions brought under
the federal securities laws.3
The federal securities laws provide that an investor may bring suit4 against a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri--Kansas City School of Law. B.S.E.
1986, The Wharton School ofthe University ofPennsylvania; JD. 1990, George Washington Law
School. The author is indebted to Karen Giannuzi and Dairen Pocsik for their encouragement and
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. In addition, the author gratefully
acknowledges that research for this Article was supported by a grant from the UMKC Law
Foundation.
1 7 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURTES REGULATION 3434 (3d ed. 1991).
2 See infra notes 59,77, 84, & 94-95.
3 For purposes of this Article, "federal securities laws" means the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1994).
4 The federal securities laws provide several express private rights of action for fraud. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (providing private right of action for
false or misleading statements appearing in a registration statement); Securities Act of 1933
§ 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994) (providing private right of action for false or misleading
statement in a prospectus or oral communication); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1994) (providing private right of action for false or misleading statements in
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company5 if the company makes a material misstatement in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.6 However, if the company is able to persuade the
court that its statement was mere "sales talk' (i.e., that the statement was too vague,
promotional, or hyperbolic), the court will designate the statement as "puffery." If
the statement is labeled as puffery, it is deemed to be immaterial as a matter of law.
Because one of the required elements of securities fraud-materiality-is absent
the court will dismiss the action. Clearly then, the puffery defense offers a defendant
a powerful tool to avoid liability under the federal securities laws.7 Once a court
determines that a statement constitutes puffery, the company will be shielded from
liability arising from that statement.
The courts have long used the puffery defense to insulate securities brokers
from liability for statements such as: "This security is a great investment. ' 8 More
recently, however, courts have extended the protections of the puffery defense to
non-broker defendants, such as corporate officers and directors.9 In these cases, the
courts used the puffery defense to dismiss actions based on vague statements of
documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
In addition to these express private rights of action, the courts have implied other private
rights of action under the federal securities laws. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (recognizing private right ofaction for violations of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,430-31 (1964)
(recognizing private right of action for violations of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
5 In addition to the company, a plaintiffmay be entitled to bring suit against other defendants,
such as the company's officers and directors, for securities fraud. For ease of reference, this Article
uses the term "company" to refer to all defendants being sued for material misrepresentations
under the federal securities laws.
6 For example, Rule lOb-5, the general anti-fraud provision under the securities laws, makes
it unlawful for any person "to make any untnie statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Substantially
identical language appears throughout the securities laws. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (a),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (false or misleading statements appearing in a registration statement);
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(aX2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(aX2) (1994) (false or misleading statements in
a prospectus or oral communication); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1994) (false or misleading statements made in connection with a tender offer); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-9(a) (1998) (false or misleading
statements made in connection with a proxy statement).
7 The puffery defense may also be used by a company to defend an enforcement action
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. However, because the majority of cases
addressing puffery have been brought by investors, as opposed to the SEC, this Article is limited
to the use of the puffery defense in private securities fraud actions.
8 See infra Part II.B.2.
9 See infra Part II.B.3.
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corporate optimism concerning future events, such as: "We expect significant
growth in earnings during the next fiscal year."10 In addition, the courts have
substantially enlarged the types of statements considered to be puffery, dismissing
actions based on statements characterizing present facts, such as: 'During the
previous quarter, we received substantial orders for our product."'11
The increased use of puffery to dismiss private securities fraud actions against
non-broker defendants and the expansion of the types of statements constituting
puffery is disturbing in several respects. First, ajudge accepting the puffery defense
may impermissibly infringe upon the role of the fact finder. Ordinarily, whether a
statement is material is a mixed question of fact and law, which should be submitted
to the jury. 12 Only under extraordinary circumstances should a court supplant the
role of the jury and pass on materiality as a matter of law.13 Given this danger of
displacing the jury, it is unsettling that courts have increasingly used the puffery
defense to dismiss private securities actions.
The re-emergence of the puffery defense is especially worrisome considering
the lack of reasoned analysis underlying the recent cases against non-broker
defendants.14 A review of these cases demonstrates that the courts have merely cited
older and distinguishable puffery cases before dismissing the case before them with
little or no analysis. The courts have failed to examine the rationales underlying the
puffery defense to determine if it makes sense in the securities regulation context.
They have failed to recognize that an investor probably would not consider a
statement made by a company's Chief Executive Officer in a public document-as
opposed to an oral statement made by a securities broker in a selling situation-to
be mere "sales talk." Even more troubling, the courts have failed to recognize that
an investor would likely attach greater significance to a Chairman's assessment of
a present fact than to a prediction of a future event. In short, the courts have
significantly expanded the scope of a powerful defense to dismiss potentially
meritorious securities fraud actions with little or no analysis or consideration of the
10 See infra Part lI.B.3.a.
11 See infra Part ll.B.3.b.
12 See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
14 Nor have commentators given any significant attention to the puffery defense. Most
commentators have simply concluded that puffery should not be a defense to securities fiaud
actions, often relying on the "dodo" quotation cited at the beginning of this Article. See, e.g.,
Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750,762 (1992) (quoting
Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURrrEs REGULATION 717 (1988)); Donald C. Langevoort,
Disclosures That "Bespeak Caution,"49 Bus. LAw. 481,487 n.42 (1994). To date, there has been
only one article focusing on puffery in the securities fraud context. See R. Gregory Rousel, Note,
Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery Defense, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 1049 (1998).
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effect of their decisions.
This Article attempts to provide such a reasoned and thorough analysis. After
examining the rationales of puffery and the policies underlying the federal securities
laws, I argue that the courts have misused the puffery defense and have improperly
insulated companies from civil liability for misrepresentations. I encourage courts
faced with vague statements of corporate optimism to undertake a full materiality
analysis rather than relying on a simple puffery review.
This Article is divided into six parts. Part II provides the legal framework for
the puffery defense. I begin with an overview of the materiality element of a
securities fraud action and then continue with a discussion of puffery. I trace the
development of puffery from its origins in the tort of deceit and misrepresentation
to its extension into the securities regulation arena. I examine the rationales
developed by the courts to explain why puffery should protect a defendant from
liability for misrepresentations. I show that puffery is based on the doctrine of
caveat emptor, or "let the buyer beware." I then offer an in-depth analysis of the
securities cases that have addressed the puffery defense and place these cases into
two distinct categories: (1) forward-looking statements and (2) statements
characterizing present facts.
Part Ill argues that puffery should not be a defense to private securities fraud
actions because the assumptions necessary to justify the use of the puffery defense
are not present in securities transactions. Specifically, I show that because investors
do not have equal access to information and because reasonable investors are
entitled to trust a company's vague statements of corporate optimism, the puffery
defense is inappropriate in private securities fraud actions. Part IV demonstrates that
puffery conflicts with the policies underlying the federal securities laws. I point out
that the federal securities laws have expressly rejected the very doctrine underlying
the puffery defense-caveat emptor.
Part V argues that the courts have lost sight of the proper inquiry-that of
materiality. I criticize the courts for erroneously substituting the puffery defense for
a full materiality analysis. The courts have improperly limited their focus to the
words or language of the company's statement, while ignoring such important
factors as who made the statement and where the statement was made. More
importantly, the courts have failed to recognize that the distinction between
forward-looking statements and statements characterizing present facts should have
an important effect on the court's materiality determination.
Finally, Part VI provides a fiamework for addressing the materiality of vague
statements of corporate optimism. Arguing that the context of the company's
statement must be examined, I offer a list of factors the court should consider in
determining whether the misrepresentation is material. Applying this suggested
approach should relegate the puffery defense in securities fraud actions back to its
proper and extinct status.
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I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Materiality
Not all misrepresentations are actionable under the federal securities laws. Only
important, or material, misstatements are actionable.15 The Supreme Court defined
materiality in the landmark case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.16 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that a statement is material if:
[There is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider [the
information] important in deciding how to [act] .... Put another way, there must be
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the [information] would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of
information made available. 17
In determining whether a statement is material, a court faces two concerns. If
the standard of materiality is set too low, then defendants will be forced to defend
actions for minor misstatements, a result unintended by Congress. 18 On the other
hand, if the standard of materiality is set too high, then poteitially meritorious
15 Seesupra note 6 and accompanying text.
16 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Although TSCIndustries involved an action brought under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it is now accepted that the definition set forth in TWC
Industries applies throughout the federal securities laws. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
232 (1988) (adopting the TSCIndustries definition for actions brought under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
17 TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 449. When the materiality of a contingent or speculative event,
such as a potential merger, is being assessed, the courts will apply a refined version of the TSC
Industries definition ofmateriality. The Supreme Court has adopted a probability/magnitude test
for determining the materiality of contingent or speculative events, which requires "a balancing
of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event." Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
18 The materiality requirement was imposed to ensure that plaintiffs could not recover for
insignificant misstatements. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,384 (1970) (stating
that materiality is required to "serve[ ] the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be
established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction .... that correction of
the defect or imposition of liability would not further the interests" of the securities laws).
In addition, if the materiality standard is set too low, there is a danger that investors will be
swamped with too much information. As the Supreme Court noted, "if the standard ofmateriality
is unnecessarily low, ... management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause
it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly
conducive to informed decisionmaking." TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 448-49.
1998]
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hand, if the standard of materiality is set too high, then potentially meritorious
actions will be erroneously dismissed as a matter of law.19
As a mixed question of fact and law, materiality is ordinarily decided by the
trier of fact.2° As the Supreme Court recognized in TSC Industries: "The
determination [of materiality] requires delicate assessments of the inferences a
'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance
of those inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of
fact"21 However, under certain limited circumstances, a district court is permitted
to bypass the jury and rule on materiality as a matter of law. For such an action to
be appropriate, the statement must be "so obviously unimportant to an investor that
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality."22 When a court
determines that a statement constitutes puffery, it is making such a determination. 23
conducive to informed decisionmaldng." 7SCIndus., 426 U.S. at 448-49.
19 In addition, if the materiality standard is set too high, investors will be deprived of
information necessary for informed decisionmaking. This would frustrate the disclosure policies
underlying the federal securities laws. See 7SCIndus., 426 U.S. at 448.
20 See id. at 450.
21/8d
22 Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272,280-81 n.11 (3d Cir. 1992); accord Pames v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a court may not rule as a
matter of law unless "a reasonable investor could not be swayed by an alleged misrepresentation");
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a court maynrle as
a matter of law if the statement is "plainly immaterial"); Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 931
(9th Cir. 1985) (stating that materiality "can be resolved on summary judgment only if the
established omissions or misstatements are 'so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable
minds cannot differ on the question of materiality' (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 438));
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a court may not rule as a
matter of law "unless [the facts] are so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that
reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance"); Huddleston v. Herman
& MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 544 n.14 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Only when the facts are so obviously
important [or unimportant] to an investor that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of
materiality may the ultimate materiality issue properly be resolved as a matter of law.), arid in
relevant part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (alteration in original).
23 As one court noted:
Strictly speaking, the securities laws recognize no distinct "puffing" exception. To say that
a statement is mere "puffing" is, in essence, to say that it is immaterial, either because it is so
exaggerated ("You cannot lose.') or so vague ("This bond is marvelous.') that a reasonable
investor would not rely on it in considering the 'total mix' of [available] information."
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186,200-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting TSC




1. Puffery as a Defense to the Tort ofDeceit or Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
The courts have recognized that puffery is a defense to the tort of deceit or
fraudulent misrepresentation. 24 Puffery is a term of art encompassing statements
considered to be non-actionable "sales tak."25 Such sales talk may involve the
quality26 of a product being sold, such as a statement by a car salesperson that a
particular automobile is the 'best" on the market,27 or may involve the value 28 of
a product being sold, such as a statement by a salesperson that his product is a
"bargain." 29
In early cases addressing the actionability of sales talk, the courts held in favor
of the sellers, reasoning that such statements constituted mere opinion and that
opinions were non-actionable because they were not statements of fact.30 Over time,
24 For a general discussion of the tort of misrepresentation, see W. PAGE KEETON Er AL.,
PROSSERANDKEE OON THELAWOFTORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984).
The concept of puffery also appears in other areas of substantive law. For example, in
contract law, if a court determines that a seller's statements constitute puffery, the statements will
not constitute an express warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. See 1 JAMES J. WHrlE
& ROBERT S. SuMMERs, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-4, at 487 (4th ed. 1995). In addition,
puffery provides a defense to actions for false advertising brought under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act See IA Louis ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETmON, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 5.19 (4th ed. 1981). In criminal law, puffery is also a factor a court may consider
in sentencing a defendant for drug offenses under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See,
e.g., United State v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217,229 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that, in determining
defendant's intent to sell a stated quantity of drugs, a court should consider whether defendant's
statements constituted 'mere puffery").
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542 cmt. e (1977) (stating that 'loose general
statements made by sellers in commending their wares ... are commonly known as 'puffing,' or
'sales talk"').
2 6 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 109, at 756 (stating that a common example of
puffery involves "loose general statements made by sellers in commending their wares").
2 7 See, eg., Hughes v. Hertz Corp., 670 So. 2d 882, 885 (Ala. 1995) (finding statement that
automobile was a "fine" car to be puffery).
2 8 See KEErONErAL, supra note 24, § 109, at 758 (stating that the "value, or financial worth,
of property is regarded as a matter of opinion... as to which 'puffing' and exaggeration are
normally to be expected").
29 See, eg., Reeb v. Daniels Lincoln-Mercury Co., Inc., 389 S.E.2d 367, 369 (Ga. App.
1989) (holding statement that automobile was a "better buy" than other cars on the market to be
puffery).
30 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Connor, 60 Me. 578, 580-81 (1872) (finding statements that land
contained "large" deposits of oil and was of "great value" to be non-actionable expressions of
1998] 1703
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
courts began to recognize that statements of opinion could be actionable, because
they were factual in at least one way: a statement of opinion rests on the factual
representation that the statement was made in good faith, that the speaker believed
the truth of the statement when made.31
Courts, however, continued to dismiss cases brought by purchasers against their
sellers for sales talk, reasoning that such statements of opinion were immaterial or,
similarly, that the purchaser was not entitled to rely on such statements.32 According
to the courts, such sales talk was so obviously unimportant as to be non-actionable.
For example, in the early case of Kimball v. Bangs,33 a seller of a heating device
made various representations to his purchaser, including statements that the product
"was of great value," that the product would produce heat without dirt, smell, or
smoke, and that the product would be cheaper than burning wood or coal.34 When
these representations turned out to be untrue, the purchaser sued the seller for deceit
The trial court found for the seller, and the purchaser appealed.35 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed, reasoning that such seller's statements
"fall within what is known as 'dealer's talk,' and are not sufficient foundation for
an action of deceit The law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the
value and qualities of the articles which they have to sell. All men know this, and
a buyer has no right to rely upon such statements."36
Judge Learned Hand echoed the reasoning of Kimball in his classic statement
of puffery:
opinion).
31 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 109, at 755.
32 The concepts of materiality and reliance are interrelated. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE
LAW OF SECURIas REGULATION § 13.5B, at 806 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that "the reliance
requirement is a corollary ofmateriality"). While materiality asks whether a reasonable investor
would find information important, reliance asks whether the investor actually relied on that
information. Because an investor would presumably not rely on unimportant information in
making a decision, the two inquiries are related.
In federal securities fraud actions, this relationship between materiality and reliance can be
seen in the adoption of a rebuttable presumption of reliance upon the plaintiff's showing of
materiality. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,247 (1988) (accepting the fraud-on-the-
market theory, which posits that "[b]ecause most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor's reliance on public material misrepresentations ... may be presumed")
(emphasis added); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)
(recognizing the presumption of reliance in cases involving non-disclosure of material
information).
33 11 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1887).
3 4 Seeid. at 113.
3 5 See id.
3 6 Id at 114.
1704 [Vol. 59:1697
PUFFERYDEFENSE
There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and if he does
he suffers from his credulity. If we were all scrupulously honest, it would not be so;
but, as it is, neither party usually believes what the seller says about his own
opinions, and each knows it37
The rationale underlying these cases was that the purchaser must have understood
that the seller was exaggerating the quality or value of his product and if he did not,
then he would pay for his ignorance.38 In other words, these cases were based on the
doctrine of caveat emptor-let the buyer beware.
Caveat emptor has been a prevailing theory of law in America since the early
nineteenth century.39 Caveat emptor is based on several different assumptions. First,
it assumes that the parties are on equal footing, with equal access to information. 40
The doctrine is based on the understanding that the purchaser is free to examine,
judge, and test the product himself before he purchases it. Thus, it assumes that the
purchaser is able to protect his own interests. According to the doctrine of caveat
emptor, because a purchaser can draw his own conclusions as to the quality and
value of the product, he is able to discount the sales talk made by the seller.
Therefore, such sales talk is non-actionable.
Second, the doctrine of caveat emptor assumes that the purchaser has no reason
to trust a seller's sales talk.41 According to caveat emptor, the purchaser and seller
are dealing at arm's length. Because the parties owe no duties to each other, they
should not trust each other. In other words, under ordinary circumstances, a
purchaser should have no reason to believe a seller's opinion. The courts, however,
37 Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918).
38 Similarly, the Second Restatement recognizes:
It is common knowledge and may always be assumed that any seller will express a favorable
opinion concerning what he has to sell; and when he praises it in general terms, without
specific content or reference to facts, buyers are expected to and do understand that they are
not entitled to rely literally upon the words.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542 crnt. e (1977).
39 For an exhaustive description of the development of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see
Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. 1133 (1931).
40 For example, in an early fraudulent misrepresentation case, a court justified its holding in
favor of a seller by reasoning that "[tihese parties were dealing at arm's length and on equal
grounds, and their own judgments were to be their guide in coming to conclusions. It is proved that
[the purchaser] had the fullest opportunity, of which he availed, to examine the property, and
afterwards [purchased it]." Miller v. Craig, 36 Ill. 109, 111 (1864).
41 SeeKEsrONETAL, supra note 24, § 109, at 755. The treatise stresses that the common law
had a "highly individualistic attitude, toward the bargaining process, in which the "parties are
expected to deal at arm's length and to beware of one another, and each is supposed to be
competent to look after his own interests, and to draw his own conclusions." Id.
1998] 1705
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recognize that under certain circumstances a purchaser is entitled to rely on a
seller's opinion. When the purchaser and seller are not in fact dealing at arm's
length, but have a relationship of trust and confidence, the courts do not punish the
purchaser for trusting the seller. Thus, the courts have developed an exception to the
doctrine of caveat emptor when a fiduciary or other close relationship exists
between the transacting parties.42
As courts began to recognize that the assumptions underlying the doctrine were
no longer present, the doctrine of caveat emptor became disfavored. The doctrine
has been curtailed or rejected in several substantive areas. For example, in contract
law, it has been largely replaced with implied warranties of merchantability 43 and
fitness for a particular purpose.44 In real property law, the courts have replaced
caveat emptor with the implied warranty of habitability in residential property
transactions.45 In securities regulation, it has been replaced by a mandatory
disclosure system.46
2. The Puffery Defense in Cases Against Brokers under the Federal
Securities Laws
Because puffery is a defense against actions for misrepresentation, defendants
attempted to extend the common law defense to actions based on misstatements
under the federal securities laws. At first, these cases involved claims against
brokers, where dissatisfied customers sued their brokers for statements regarding
the quality of the security. For example, a broker might have told a client that a
particular security constituted a "marvelous" 47 investment. Or a broker might have
made representations concerning the future return on an investment such as that the
customer would make "good money"48 or would receive a "significant tax-free
return"' 49 on a particular security.
Most courts held that these kinds of statements by brokers constituted non-
42 Such relationships included family relationships, traditional fiduciary relationships such
as those between attorney and client and between the executor and a beneficiary of an estate, and
other close relationships in which trust is customarily reposed in another person. See id. at 760.
43 See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1998) (creating implied warranty of merchantability).
44 See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1998) (creating implied warranty offitness for aparticularpurpose).
45 For a good discussion of the causes of the rejection of the doctrine of caveat emptor in real
property transactions, see Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed?-Doubting the
Demise of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387,394-97 (1996).
46 See infra notes 113-14 & 132 and accompanying text.
47 See Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15,21 (2d Cir. 1984).
48 SeeNewman v. L.F. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (SJD.N.Y. 1986).
49 See Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 653,657 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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actionable puffery.50 The courts implicitly adopted the caveat emptor reasoning of
non-securities cases, stressing that a reasonable investor could not have found such
statements to be important. As one court stated:
Courts have recognized a category of statements by brokers which are better
characterized as "puffery" than as material misstatements. When a broker calls a
bond "marvelous," or says a stock is so "red hot' that the investor "could not lose,"
or claims that his primary purpose is to make money for the customer, the
reasonable investor is presumed to understand that this is nothing more than the
"common puff ofa salesman," not a material factual misstatement 51
The courts have, however, rejected the puffery defense in one particular
circumstance. When a broker promises a specific return on the investment as
opposed to a general promise of profitability, the courts will not accept the puffery
defense.52 For example, in Newman v. L.F. Rothschild,5 3 a broker told his customers
that they would earn a return of 20% to 30% without risk. The court rejected the
broker's argument that such a statement constituted puffery, reasoning that the
"inclusion of a specific percentage... puts the misrepresentation in a different
category" 54 from those statements constituting puffery. According to these cases,
when a broker includes a specific percentage in his statement it is reasonable for an
50 See Zerman, 735 F.2d at 21 (holding broker's statement that bonds constituted a
"marvelous" investment to be non-actionable under the federal securities laws); Cohen, 713 F.
Supp. at 658 (holding that broker's statement that the customer would receive "a very strong cash
flow without risk to her initial investment' approached puffery); Newman, 651 F. Supp. at 163
(holding broker's statement that the customer would "make good money" on a security to be non-
actionable under the federal securities laws); Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 113
(N.D. 11I. 1973) (holding broker's statement that a security was "red hot' to be non-actionable
under the federal securities laws); Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(holding broker's statement that the customer would make "substantial profits without
extraordinary speculative risk" to be non-actionable under the federal securities laws); see also
Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Betterfor Investors Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1503, 1522 (1996) (recognizing that "courts allow brokers to engage in certain nonactionable
puffery').
51 Newman, 651 F. Supp. at 163 (citations omitted).
52 See Shamsi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 87,92 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding
that a broker's guarantee of a 10% return on investment was not puffery); Cohen, 713 F. Supp. at
658 (holding that a broker's statement promising a 13.4% return on investment was not puffery);
Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, 662 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a broker's
guarantee of a 20% to 30% return on investment was not puffery); Rotstein, 359 F. Supp. at 113
(holding that a broker's promise that a stock's price would reach $30 per share was not puffery).
53 662 F. Supp. at 957.
54 Id. at 959.
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investor to believe the broker's statement.55
Although courts have been willing to use the puffery defense to dismiss actions
against brokers, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been unwilling
to accept the puffery defense in its enforcement actions. The SEC has consistently
rejected the use of the puffery defense, holding that the defense is inapplicable in the
securities regulation context.56
3. The Puffery Defense in Securities Cases Against Non-Brokers
Non-broker defendants, such as companies and their officers and directors, also
seized on the puffery defense and attempted to use it to dismiss actions brought
against them for material misstatements under the federal securities laws. These
actions were based on the company's vague statements of corporate optimism.57 A
55 See Cohen, 713 F. Supp. at 658 (stating that the promise of areturn of 13.4% withoutrisk
was not "so unbelievable that an investor could not reasonably rely upon it").
56 See In re John R. Brick, 46 S.E.C. 43, 52 n.23 (1975) (stating that "the concept ofpuffing
has no place in these consumer-protection statutes"); In re C.R. Richmond & Co., No. 3-4656,
1975 SEC LEXIS 2555, *14 (Aug. 15, 1975) (stating that "lax merchandising standards
epitomized by such terms as 'puffing' are antithetical to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
statutes"); In re Cortlandt Investing Corp., 44 S.E.C. 45, 50 (1969) (stating that "the doctrine of
caveat emptor, from which the concept of 'puffing' is derived, can have little application under
the antifraud provisions ofthe securities acts"); In re Norman Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 852, 856 (1968)
(same); In re Irving Friedman, 43 S.E.C. 314, 319 (1967) (stating that "the doctrine of caveat
emptor, from which the concept of 'puffing' is derived, can have little application to the
merchandising of securities"); In re Marketlines, Inc., No. 3-227, 1966 SEC LEXIS 2387, *35
(Mar. 16, 1966) (stating that the "lax merchandising standards epitomized by such terms as
'puffing' are antithetical to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities statutes"); In re Hamilton
Waters & Co., 42 S.E.C. 784,790 (1965) (stating that puffery "has little application under the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws"); In re Spear & Staff, Inc., 42 S.E.C. 549, 553 (1965)
(stating that "lax merchandising standards epitomized by such terms as 'puffing' are antithetical
to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities statutes"); In re Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41
S.E.C. 566, 570 (1963) (stating that "[t]he doctrine of caveat emptor 'can have little application
to the merchandising of securities") (quoting In re B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210, 216
(1962)); In re Diotron, Inc., No. 24W-2492, 1963 SEC LEXIS 2449, *48-49 (July 31, 1963)
(same); In re N. Sims & Co., 40 S.E.C. 573, 575 (1961) (holding puffery inapplicable in securities
regulation context).
For additional discussion of the Fennekohl case, see infra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
57 These vague statements of corporate optimism are a type of "soft" information. Soft
information is a term of art comprising several different categories of information, including
forward-looking statements, such as projections and forecasts, as well as opinions, statements of
motives and purposes, and evaluations. See Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information
in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972). The term "soft' information is used to
distinguish this type of information from historical, or "hard," information. See id at 254-55.
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review of these cases indicates that the courts have applied the puffery defense in
two distinct situations: (1) when a company has made a vague forward-looking
statement, 58 and (2) when a company has made a vague statement characterizing
present facts.
a. A Company's Vague Forward-Looking Statements
The majority of puffery cases involve optimistic forward-looking statements
made by companies. There are three different types of vague forward-looking
statements that have been labeled non-actionable puffery: (1) statements predicting
a company's financial performance, (2) statements predicting the success of a new
product, and (3) statements predicting the effect of management strategies or
practices.
Many of the securities cases brought against non-broker defendants that address
puffery involve predictions of the company's financial performance, such as
optimistic statements of future company earnings, revenues, sales, or growth.59
58 Forward-looking statements are "statements concerning the future, such as projections,
forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and expectations." Id. at 255.
59 See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310,313 (3d Cir. 1997) (company stated itwas
"'confident' of achieving at least 7% real earnings growth" in the next fiscal year); Pames v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F3d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 1997) (company stated it "anticipate[d] significant
growth"); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F3d 1410, 1427 (3d Cir. 1997) (company
stated that it "believe[d] [it could] continue to grow net earnings at a faster rate than sales" and that
it was "comfort[able]" with analyst projections of earnings per share); Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107
F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 1997) (company stated it "expect[ed] continued revenue growth"); San
Leandro Emergency Med. Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F3d 801, 806 (2d Cir. 1996) (company
stated it was "optimistic" about future earnings); Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc.,
42 F.3d 204, 206 (4th Cir. 1994) (company stated that "significant sales gains should be seen as
the year progresses" and that "1992 will produce excellent results"); Malone v. Microdyne Corp.,
26 F.3d 471,473 (4th Cir. 1994) (company stated it was "comfortable' with analyst earnings
estimates); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272,283-84 n.12 (3d Cir. 1992) (company stated
that it 'ook[ed] to the future with great optimism"); In re Boston Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM) 90,174, at 90,574 (D. Mass. Feb. 5,1998) (company stated that
it believed it would "experience the same rate of growth [experienced in 1995] in fiscal 1996');
Schoenhaut v. American Sensors, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 785, 792 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (company
stated that "it anticipated increasing customer demand"); Gilford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic
Elec. Corp., No. 96-C4072, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19032, *5 (ND. 111. Nov. 12, 1997) (company
stated that "its European revenues would grow by at least 20%"); In re V-Mark Software, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 928 F. Supp. 122, 123 (D. Mass. 1996) (company stated that it was "comfortable" with
analysts' earnings estimates); Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,999, at 93,872 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 1995) (company stated that it "continue[d] to
be enthusiastic about our opportunities to grow').
Related to these kind of optimistic statements concerning a company's future financial
performance are statements concerning the worth or value of the company's securities, such as a
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Companies often make general forward-looking statements in their annual reports
to shareholders or in meetings with securities analysts. For example, a company
may state that it expects to achieve "significant" earnings. If the company
experiences disappointing results, investors may bring suit under the federal
securities laws contending that the prediction constituted a material misstatement
The courts have generally held that these kinds of vague statements of corporate
optimism constitute non-actionable puffery.
An example of this approach can be found in Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc.60
In Parnes, a company stated in its prospectus that it "anticipate[d] significant
growth in the future."61 Within a year, the company's earnings per share dropped
dramatically, and investors brought suit contending that the company's statement
constituted a material misrepresentation under several provisions of the federal
securities laws.62 The district court dismissed the complaint 63 and the plaintiffs
appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the company's statement
constituted puffery and was therefore immaterial as a matter of law.64
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by conceding that materiality is ordinarily
a question for the jury.65 However, the court pointed out that "[w]here a reasonable
investor could not have been swayed by an alleged misrepresentation," 66 a court is
entitled to rule on materiality as a matter of law. The court noted that "some
statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor
would rely upon them."67 The court reasoned: "[S]oft, puffing statements generally
lack materiality because the market price of a share is not inflated by vague
statements predicting growth. No reasonable investor would rely on these
statements, and they are certainly not specific enough to perpetrate a fraud on the
market."68 After citing several other puffery cases, the court held that the statement
statement by an officer that his company's securities constitute a "good investment." See Howard
v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1992). In Howard, the Fourth Circuit found that statement
to constitute puffery. See iad at 331. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on cases holding
that similar statements made by brokers to their clients were immaterial. See id. at 331 n.11. For
a discussion of the use of puffery in cases involving brokers, see supra Part II.B.2.
60 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
61 Id. at 542.
62 See id. at 544.
63 See id. at 545.
64 See id. at 547.
6 5 See id. at 546.
66Id.
67 Id at 547.




that the company expected "significant" growth constituted puffery.69
In cases involving predictions of a company's financial performance, the courts
have drawn a distinction between general optimistic statements, which constitute
puffery, and specific predictions of financial performance, which do not.70 If the
company attaches a number or range of numbers to its prediction, the courts will
reject the puffery defense.71 For example, in Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co.,72 a
company stated that it was "confident" that it would achieve "at least 7% real
earnings growth" 73 in the following fiscal year. When earnings did not live up to
these expectations, investors sued. The district court dismissed the action, ruling that
the company's statement constituted immaterial puffery.74 The Third Circuit
reversed, observing that the statement was not a "vague expression of optimism." 7 5
Because it was a "specific figure regarding a particular, defined time period," 76 the
Third Circuit held that the statement was not puffery.
The puffery defense may also be implicated when a company makes statements
predicting the success of a new product.77 At the launch of a new product,
6 9 See id
7 0 This distinction between general and specific statements has also been made by courts in
cases against securities brokers. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
71 See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a
prediction of"at least 7% real earnings growth" was not puffery because it "was a specific figure
regarding a particular, defined time period"); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1428 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a statement that a company was "comfortable"
with analysts' projections of earnings per share of $1.20 to $1.30 was not puffery because it was
"an agreement with a specific forecast range"); Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir.
1997) (noting the importance of "specific numbers" in assessing the materiality of a prediction);
In re V-Mark Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 122, 123-24 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that
a statement that a company was "comfortable' with analysts' earnings estimates of 32 cents to 33
cents per share was not puffery because it "mentioned definite earnings and precise revenue
numbers"); Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1314 (D.N.H. 1996) (noting that a
statement by a company that is "sufficiently specific" may be actionable). But see Raab v. General
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286,289 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a statement that a company expected
an "annual growth rate of 10% and 30% over the next several years" constituted puffery).
72 129 F.3d at 310.
7 3 Id at 313.
74 See id at 314.
75 Id. at 320.
76Id.
7 7 See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617,635 (1st Cir. 1996) (statement that
the company expected a new product to "broaden the number of customers in existing accounts
as well as attract new customers" was puffery); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d
1096, 1118 (D. Nev. 1998) (statement that a new hotel and casino would "become the symbol of
Las Vegas" was puffery); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 832 F. Supp. 909, 916 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (statements that product was "revolutionary" and could "change the world" were puffery);
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companies often issue press releases or make other public statements touting the
qualities and features of the product along with optimistic statements about the
product's potential for success. If the product does not turn out to be as wonderful
as its press, investors may bring suit contending that the company's statement
constituted a material misrepresentation. The courts have held that these types of
statements constitute non-actionable puffery.
A good example of this type of puffery case is In re Storage Technology Corp.
Securities Litigation.78 In that case, a company official stated that the company was
"proud" of its new computer and predicted that it would be a "blowout winner."7 9
Soon after, however, the company disclosed that it was experiencing significant
production problems with the new product 80 The company's stock price declined,81
and disappointed investors brought suit under several provisions of the federal
securities laws.82 Reasoning that no reasonable investor would have been misled by
the company's statement, the district court held that the company's vague forward-
looking statement constituted immaterial puffery.83
The puffery defense has also been used by courts to dismiss actions based on
a company's descriptions of its management strategies.84 When a company informs
the market of its current strategies, it also often makes optimistic statements that the
strategy will be beneficial to the company. If the strategy does not prove to be
successful, investors may bring suit against the company, contending that the
statement constituted a material misrepresentation. The courts have determined that
these statements constitute non-actionable puffery.
In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (D. Colo. 1992) (statement that a
new product would be a "blowout winner" was puffery).
78 804 F. Supp. at 1368.
79 Id. at 1372.
80 See id. at 1371.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 1372.
84 See Lasker v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 85 F3d 55,57 (2d Cir. 1996) (statement
that the company's "diversification activities demonstrate our commitment to create earnings
opportunities out of the challenges to utility deregulation" held to be puffery); In re Boston Tech.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,174, at 90,578 (D. Mass. Apr. 15,
1998) (statement that the company was "highly focused on providing enhanced services
specifically for the needs of the wireless service" marketplace held to be puffery); Simon v.
American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 428 (D.RI. 1996) (statement that the
company recognized the "significance of newly emerging international markets and the vast
potential for [its] products in these areas of the world" held to be puffery); Bentley v. Legent Corp.,
849 F. Supp. 429, 432 (E.D. Va. 1994) (statement that the company's expense controls were
"ightf' held to be puffery).
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In Lasker v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp.,85 NYSEG, a public utility,
obtained authorization to invest in certain unregulated businesses.86 In its Annual
Report on Form 10-K, NYSEG informed its investors of its diversification strategy,
but assured them that it would "not compromise its financial integrity."87 It
described the company's diversification activities and then stated that "[t]hese
diversification activities demonstrate our commitment to create earnings
opportunities out of the challenges to utility deregulation." 88 Unfortunately,
NYSEG's diversification strategy led to losses, and the company was forced to cut
its dividend.89 Investors brought suit against the utility, contending that the
statements constituted material misrepresentations. 90 The district court dismissed
the complaint 9' and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the statements of
management strategies constituted non-actionable puffeiry.92 In reaching this
conclusion, the Second Circuit reasoned that "[a] reasonable investor would not
believe that by merely making the broad, general statements..., NYSEG had
insured against the risks inherent in diversification."9 3
b. A Company's Vague Statements Characterizing Present Facts
The second category of puffeiry cases involve a company's vague statements
characterizing present facts. Many of these cases involve statements characterizing
the status of on-going transactions affecting the company 94 or current or past
company performance.95 If the company's assessment of these facts was untrue
85 85 F.3d at 55.






92 See id. at 59.
93 Id
94 See Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1997) (statement that the
bidding process in an auction of the company was going "very well" and "very smoothly" held
to be puffery); In re Healthco Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 777 F. Supp. 109, 115 (D. Mass. 1991)
(statement that the company was "comfortable' that a merger "would close before the late
February deadline" held to be puffery). Although each of these cases involved the disclosure of
a speculative or contingent event, neither court conducted the probability/magnitude test for
materiality set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). For a
discussion of the probability/magnitude test, see supra note 17.
95 See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding statement
that the company had achieved "substantial success" in integrating the sales forces of two merged
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when made, investors may bring suit arguing that the statement constituted a
material misrepresentation. In general, however, the courts have determined that
these assessments constitute non-actionable puffery.
For example, in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.,96 the board of directors of Centel
Corp. ("Centel") determined that their company should be sold.97 Management
decided to conduct an auction where prospective purchasers were invited to make
bids to buy the company.98 During the time the auction was open, Centel stated that
the bidding process "continue[d] to go very well" and was progressing "very
smoothly."99 In actuality, however, it was not; Centel had realized that it was going
to receive fewer bids than it had anticipated.' 00 Ultimately, the auction failed, and
Centel negotiated a sale to another company at a much lower price than expected.' 0 '
The price of Centel stock, which had risen to $48 per share on the date of the
announcement of the auction,'0 2 fell to $32 per share on the date of the
announcement of the private sale.103 Shareholders who had purchased Centel stock
after the announcement of the auction brought suit under various provisions of the
federal securities laws, contending that Centel's statement constituted a material
companies and statement that the merger process had been moving 'Taster than we thought" to be
puffery); Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 995 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding statement that a
company had received "significant orders" for its product to be puffery); Shaw v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding statement that a company's transition to selling
a new kind of product was "going reasonably well" and that the company was "healthy" to be
puffery); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding statement that company
was "recession-resistant" to be puffery); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., I F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1118 (D. Nev. 1998) (holding statement that the opening of the company's new hotel was going
"very smoothly" and that a "steady stream of people' were visiting to be puffery); In re Nokia
Corp. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,195, at 90,705 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 6, 1998) (finding statement that "we have seen continued strengthening' in market position
and that the "market position in its main businesses continued to improve' to be puffery);
Freedman v. Value Health, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 745, 760-61 (D. Conn. 1997) (refusing to rule as
a matter of law that statement that a company was a "thriving business" was puffery); Schaffer v.
Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1314 (D.N.H. 1996) (holding statement that retail demand
for the company's product "was not a problem" and that the brand remained "strong" not to be
puffery); In re Apple Computer See. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1572 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding
statement that the company's personal computer "is clearly being recognized as an important force
in the office market" to be puffery).
96 113 F.3d at 738.
97 See id. at 740.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 741.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 742.
102 See id at 740.
103 Seeid. at 742.
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misrepresentation.' 0 4 Centel argued that its statement constituted puffery, and the
Seventh Circuit agreed. The court reasoned:
We doubt that nonspecific representations that an auction process is going well or
going smoothly could ... influence a reasonable investor to pay more for stock than
he otherwise would. Everybody knows that someone trying to sell something is
going to look and talk on the bright side. You don't sell a product by bad mouthing
it. ... It would be unreasonable for investors to attach significance to general
expressions of satisfaction with the progress of the seller's efforts to sell, just as it
would be unreasonable for them to infer from a potential bidder's apparent lack of
enthusiasm that the bidder was uninterested rather than just jockeying for a better
price.105
I1. THE ASSUMPTIONS NECESSARY TO JusTFY THE PUFFERY DEFENSE ARE
NOT PRESENT IN SECURmES TRANSACTIONS
As the preceding section of this Article demonstrates, courts have relied on the
common law puffery defense to dismiss private actions brought under the federal
securities laws. However, these courts have failed to recognize that the assumptions
justifying the use of the puffery defense are not present in securities transactions.
The puffery defense is based on the doctrine of caveat emptor-let the buyer
beware.106 As discussed above,107 caveat emptor is based on two assumptions: (1)
that the parties have equal access to information; and (2) that the parties have no
reason to trust each other. As the following analysis demonstrates, these two
assumptions are not necessarily valid in securities transactions. Because the
assumptions justifying the puffery defense do not apply, courts should not use the
puffery defense as a grounds for dismissing actions brought under the federal
securities laws.
A. Investors Do Not Have Equal Access to Information
The doctrine of caveat emptor assumes that the buyer and seller have equal
access to information.' 0 8 By making a physical examination of the product, the
buyer can draw his own conclusions as to its quality and value. In other words, the
buyer is free to "look under the hood" and "kick the tires" before he makes the
104 See id at 740.
105 Id at 745.
106 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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purchase. Therefore, according to the doctrine of caveat emptor, the seller's
exaggerated statements concerning the product should assume no significance to the
buyer, who is able to discount the sales talk through his own investigation.
Obviously, an investor cannot make a similar physical examination of a
security. Therefore, it would appear that the doctrine of caveat emptor has no
application to a securities transaction. In fact, this is the position taken by the
SEC.' 09 For example, in In re B. Fennekohl & Co.,1 10 the SEC rejected a broker's
argument that his exaggerated statements to a client constituted non-actionable
puffery."II The SEC reasoned:
The concept of "puffing" is derived from the doctrine of caveat emptor and arises
primarily in the sale of tangibles where it appears that examination by the purchaser
may offset exaggerated statements and expressions of opinion by the salesman. It
can have little application to the merchandising of securities. 112
At first glance, this appears to be correct. It is true that a physical examination
of a security certificate would not enable an investor to discount a company's
optimistic statements. However, this analysis is overly simplistic. The investor has
other resources available that may allow him to come to his own independent
conclusions concerning the company's statement. Specifically, the investor has
access to information disclosed by the company, either voluntarily, or more likely,
pursuant to the federal securities laws. Therefore, it is necessary to determine
whether a company's disclosures puts the investor and the company on equal
footing, justifying a defense based on the doctrine of caveat emptor.
The federal securities laws are based on a philosophy of full and fair
disclosure. 113 Under certain circumstances, companies are required to make
significant disclosures to their investors.1 14 The mandatory disclosure system was
109 For a listing of administrative cases holding that the doctrine of caveat emptor is
inconsistent with the sale of a security, see supra note 56.
11041 S.E.C. 210 (1962).
111 See id. at 216.
112 Id at 212. Only a handful of courts have recognized this distinction. See SEC v. First Am.
Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing Fennekoho; Nivram Corp. v.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 243,252 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Fennekoho;
Floumay v. Peyson, 701 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (N.D. I11. 988) (citing Fennekoho.
113 For a good description of the adoption ofthe disclosure philosophy underlying the federal
securities laws, see I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 171-206.
114 These disclosures are made in specific disclosure documents that must contain certain
information deemed important to an investment decision. The disclosure document will include
information about the company, such as a description of the company's business, a description of
the company's management, and the company's financial statements. If the disclosure document
relates to a specific transaction, the disclosure document will also contain information relevant to
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an attempt to "level the playing field" and correct the informational asymmetries
existing between a company and the investing public. Although the mandatory
disclosure system goes a long way toward placing the investor and the company on
equal footing, it does not entirely succeed.
First, the federal securities laws do not always require the disclosure of
information in a securities transaction. For example, certain sales of securities are
exempt altogether from the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. 15
Similarly, the federal securities laws do not always require a company to make
disclosure when it is requesting its shareholders to vote their securities. 116 Finally,
not all companies are required to make on-going disclosures in the form of annual
and quarterly reports. 117 In these instances, unless a company makes voluntary
the transaction. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITms REGULATION: CAsEs AND MATERIALS 244
(2d ed. 1997).
115 The federal securities laws make it unlawful to sell securities unless a registration
statement is in effect. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). However, there are
several important exemptions that will permit a sale without disclosure. Section 3 of the Securities
Act of 1933 exempts certain types of securities from all regulation under the federal securities
laws. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994). Section 4 of the Securities Act of
1933 exempts certain transactions from the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994). For example, section 4(2), commonly
called the private placement exemption, permits a company to sell its securities to certain types of
investors without preparing a registration statement. Investors purchasing securities in a private
placement, therefore, may not receive any disclosure from the company. For a general discussion
of the exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933, see HAZEN, supra note 32, § 4.1, at 163.116 The federal securities laws make it unlawful for a company to solicit proxies unless the
company has provided its shareholders with a proxy statement, a specific type of disclosure
document. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1998). However, the
proxy rules are intended to reach only larger, more established, companies. Their scope is limited
to the solicitation of proxies relating to securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
A company is required to register a class of securities under section 12 in only two instances. First,
the company must register the security if it is traded on a national securities exchange. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1994). Second, the company must
register the security if the company has assets exceeding $10 million and has more than 500
shareholders of record. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1994);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R § 240.12g-1 (1998). For a general
discussion of the proxy rules, see HAZEN, supra note 32, § 11.2, at 555. -
117 The federal securities laws require that certain companies make periodic disclosure in the
form of annual and quarterly reports. However, this disclosure requirement is limited to companies
with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
to companies with an effective registration statement. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1994).
For a general discussion of the periodic disclosure requirements, see HAZEN, supra note 32, § 9.3,
at414.
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disclosure, investors will not have the information necessary to draw their own
conclusions as to a company's vague statement of corporate optimism.
Even if the federal securities laws do require disclosure, the disclosure may not
necessarily place the investor and the company on equal footing. Because the
company prepares the disclosure document, the investor obtains the information
second-hand, it has been filtered by the company. It is one thing to be able to look
under the hood to determine whether a car is in good working condition. It is quite
another thing to make that determination from a description of the engine prepared
by the seller. Second-hand information does not have the same utility to an investor.
More importantly, no matter what information is disclosed to the investing
public, the company and its representatives will always have additional, and often
better, information than the public. Even the federal securities laws, with their
significant disclosure obligations, do not require the company to disclose all
information to the public. 118 As the Supreme Court recognized, "[s]hareholders
know that directors usually have knowledge... far exceeding the normal investor's
resources."1 19
The company's superior access to information is especially true of the kinds of
vague statements of corporate optimism that the courts have determined to
constitute puffery. An examination of the different categories of vague statements
reveals that the information underlying these statements is particularly within the
control of the company.
1. A Company's Vague Forward-Looking Statement
A company's prediction of financial performance, such as a statement that it
expects "strong" earnings in the next fiscal year, may be based on the results of
sophisticated models using assumptions that are unavailable to investors. In order
to understand and assess a company's forward-looking statement, an investor needs
to know the underlying assumptions.120 However, a company is not required to
118 Significantly, the federal securities laws do not generally require a company to disclose
forward-looking statements or other soft information. See HAZEN, supra note 32, § 3.7, at 154. For
a discussion of a company's limited obligation to disclose forward-looking statements, see Joel
Seligman, The SEC's Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1953, 1962-
75 (1995).
119 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091 (1991).
120 The importance of the underlying assumptions to an investor's appreciation of a
company's forward-looking statement is well recognized. For example, in recommending that the
SEC permit companies to make voluntary disclosure of forward-looking statements, the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure noted that the assumptions underlying the forward-looking
statement constituted important information to many investors because they "provide[ ] a
framework for the analysis of the projection." ADVISORY COMM. ON CORP. DIsCLOSURE, 95TH
CONG., lST SESS., REPORT TO THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N 358 (Comm. Print 1977). Similarly,
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disclose to its investors the methodologies or assumptions underlying its forward-
looking statements. 121 Therefore, the investor is unable to come to his own
conclusions concerning the accuracy of the company's statement and cannot
discount the company's statement as being overly enthusiastic.122 Because the
investor and the company do not have equal access to information, the doctrine of
caveat emptor is inapplicable, and the puffery defense should not be applied.
Similarly, when a company launches a product and states, for example, that the
product will be a "success," it is basing this prediction on information unavailable
to investors. Presumably, before making such a statement, the company will have
undertaken product feasibility studies and marketing research studies. These studies
are normally unavailable to the company's investors. Therefore, an investor will not
be able to make his own assessment as to the product's likelihood of success. Once
again, because of the information asymmetries existing between the company and
the investor, the puffery defense should not be used to dismiss securities fraud
actions.
Finally, a company's disclosure of its management strategy and objectives,
such as a statement that it will seek out a particular market segment, is based on
information that is not available to its investors. The decision to pursue a particular
strategy is made by a company's officers and directors, presumably after careful
consideration and an assessment of other alternatives. Investors are not ordinarily
the SEC, in promulgating a safe harbor for the disclosure of forward-looking statements, stressed
that the disclosure of the company's underlying assumptions is "an important factor in facilitating
investors' ability to comprehend and evaluate" the forward-looking statement. Safe Harbor Rule
for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33-6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,117, at 81,942 (June 25, 1979).
121 The SEC does not require the disclosure of a company's underlying assumptions for the
company to receive the protections of the safe harbor rule for the disclosure of forward-looking
statements. See Securities Act of 1933 Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1998). However, several
courts have indicated that the disclosure of the underlying assumptions is necessary in order for
an investor to gain an appreciation for the forward-looking statement and to prevent the statement
from becoming misleading. See COX Er AL, supra note 114, at 78. For an argument that the SEC
should adopt an interpretive release to help companies determine when and how they should
disclose the assumptions underlying their forward-looking statements, see Seligman, supra note
118, at 1981-86.
122 If the company discloses sufficient cautionary language that indicates that the projection
or forecast may not be realized, the company may be able to use a different defense-the
"bespeaks caution' doctrine-to protect itself from civil liability under the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. For a good introduction to the bespeaks caution doctrine, see
Langevoort, supra note 14, at 481. In addition, the company may be able to rely on a statutory safe
harbor modeled on the judicially created bespeaks caution doctrine. For an introduction to the
statutory safe harbor, see Carl W. Schneider & Jay A. Dubow, Forward-Looking Information-
Navigating in the Safe Harbor, 51 Bus. LAw. 1071 (1996). For additional discussion of the
bespeaks caution doctrine, see infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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privy to the meetings and deliberations made by a company's management.
Therefore, investors are not in a position to determine whether the company's
statement concerning its strategy and objectives is overly optimistic or not. Because
investors and the company do not have equal access to information, the doctrine of
caveat emptor is inapplicable, and the puffery defense should not be used by courts
to dismiss securities fraud actions.
2. A Company's Vague Statement Characterizing Present Facts
As the preceding section demonstrates, the information that is necessary for
investors to draw their own conclusions as to a company's forward-looking
statement is not generally available to investors. Similarly, the information that will
enable investors to assess a company's vague statement characterizing present facts
is also unavailable to the investors. For example, when a company states that
negotiations with a potential merger partner are proceeding "well," it is basing this
statement on information that is not generally available to investors. Such a
characterization of the status of an on-going transaction may be made only upon an
evaluation of many intangibles-a participant's tone of voice, facial expression,
word choice, etc.123 The company's investors are not able to assess first-hand the
ebb and flow of the negotiation process. Unless investors have an alternative source,
the only information they will have concerning the status of a merger would come
from the company itself. Clearly then, investors do not have the information to
make their own assessment of an on-going transaction. Therefore, they would be
unable to offset the company's optimistic statement with their own conclusion.
Similarly, when a company states that current retail demand for its products is
"good," investors do not generally have information that will enable them to offset
the company's optimism. Unless journalists publish conflicting reports, or investors
undertake an informal survey of the company's customers, investors will not be able
to draw their own conclusions as to the demand for the company's products. The
company has a virtual monopoly on the information underlying its statement Once
again, because the assumption that is necessary to justify the use of the puffery
defense is absent, the courts should not use puffery to dismiss securities fraud
actions.
B. A Reasonable Investor May Trust a Company's Optimistic Statements
The doctrine of caveat emptor is premised on the principle that there is, and
123 For a discussion of the important role non-verbal communication plays in the negotiation




should be, a distrust between the buyer and the seller.124 In other words, a
purchaser, if acting reasonably, does not trust the sales talk of a seller. This is so
because the purchaser understands that a seller commonly exaggerates in order to
consummate the sale of a product125 In addition, because the seller is a stranger to
the purchaser, the purchaser has no reason to believe the seller's statements of
quality and value.126 These assumptions are not necessarily valid in a securities
transaction. In fact; there are several differences present in a securities transaction
that may allow a reasonable investor to trust a company's vague statement of
corporate optimism.
First; a company making a vague statement of corporate optimism may not be
acting as a seller at all. Certainly, a company making a prediction of financial
performance, or a statement concerning a new product may do so when it is issuing
securities. However, it is just as likely to make such a statement when it is not
selling securities, such as in an earnings announcement or in an annual report to
investors. If the company is not acting as a seller, the investor would not necessarily
conclude that the company is exaggerating in order to make sure that its securities
were sold. 127 Thus, it is more reasonable for the investor to trust the company's
optimistic statement. When a company is not selling securities, then, one of the
assumptions justifying puffery does not apply. Therefore, the puffery defense should
not be used to protect a company from civil liability under the federal securities
laws.
Second, the investor and the company may not be strangers to each other. If the
investor is an existing shareholder of the company, the company, through its officers
and directors, owes fiduciary duties to the investor.128 As the Supreme Court noted,
124 See supra note 41 and accompanying text
125 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
12 6 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
127 Of course, a company has incentive to make optimistic statements, even if it is not selling
securities. A company is concerned with its stock price, and, presumably, optimistic statements
will cause an increase in the price of a company's stock. Given this incentive, it could be argued
that reasonable investors should automatically discount all optimistic statements made by a
company because they should know that the company is making the optimistic statement to drive
up the market price ofthe company's stock. Such an argument, however, proves too much. Such
an argument leads to the conclusion that investors are not entitled to trust any optimistic statements
made by a company. Such a sweeping conclusion is obviously erroneous. Furthermore, such an
outcome would conflict with the policies underlying the federal securities laws. See infra Part IV.
128 A complete discussion of the fiduciary duties owed by a company's officers and directors
would exceed the scope of this Article. However, put simply, officers and directors owe a duty of
care and a duty of loyalty to their corporation. See I PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Pt. IV, at 137 (1994). The duty of care requires officers and
directors:
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it is "common knowledge" that officers and directors must "exercise their judgment
in the shareholders' interest." 129 Given these fiduciary duties, it becomes more
reasonable for the investor to believe the company's optimistic statements.130
Finally, the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws make it more
likely that a reasonable investor would believe the company's optimistic statements.
Investors know that the securities industry is highly regulated. They understand that
a company risks substantial liability for false or misleading statements.1 31
Therefore, it is more reasonable for investors to believe a company's statements
made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security than statements made by
a seller in connection with the sale of a tangible product. Because one of the
assumptions underlying the puffery defense is absent the courts should not use
puffery to dismiss securities fraud actions.
IV. THE PUFFERY DEFENSE CONFLICTS WITH THE PoLICIES UNDERLYING
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The federal securities laws explicitly rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor,
replacing it with a policy of full and fair disclosure.132 Puffery, on the other hand,
Mo perform the director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances.
Id § 4.01, at 138. The duty ofloyalty requires the directors and officers to act fairly. See id § 5.01,
at 205.
12 9 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091 (1991).
130 Even the common law doctrine of caveat emptor acknowledged that a relationship of trust
and confidence justified the purchaser's trust in the seller. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
131 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
132 As the Supreme Court has noted, a'Tundamental purpose" of the federal securities laws
was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); accord Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,235 (1988); Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477 (1977); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,431 (1953). One commentator has noted that the recent
enactment of the statutory safe harbor modeled on the bespeaks caution doctrine may indicate
some congressional approval of the doctrine of caveat emptor. See Roussel, supra note 14, at 1071
n.98. However, such limited acceptance certainly does not signal a return to the "let the buyer
beware" environment that existed prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws.
1722 [Vol. 59:1697
PUFFERYDEFENSE
is firmly grounded on the doctrine of "let the buyer beware. ' 133 The conflict
between these two policies is readily apparent and can be demonstrated through a
simple example. Assume that an officer of a corporation is asked to comment on the
development of a new product. He responds that it is going "well." In actuality,
however, it is not. Investors bring suit contending that the statement constituted a
material misrepresentation under the federal securities laws. The company argues
that the officer's statement constituted non-actionable puffery. Ifa court agrees, then
it is sending a message to investors that they cannot believe the company's
disclosure. It is saying that, even though the company's officer said that the
transaction was going "well," investors should have second-guessed the honesty of
the officer and the accuracy of the statement In effect, the court is signaling a return
to the doctrine of caveat emptor, a result clearly at odds with the policies of the
federal securities laws.
Puffery is based on the assumption that a purchaser should not trust a seller's
optimistic statements. It encourages and rewards a distrust between the parties to a
transaction. The federal securities laws, however, do not intend to encourage distrust
between investors and companies. On the contrary, the federal securities laws were
enacted to create an environment in which an investor should trust a company's
disclosure.
One of the primary goals underlying the enactment of the federal securities
laws was the restoration of public confidence in the securities markets. 134 Congress
recognized that, prior to the federal securities laws, sellers routinely made
exaggerated statements concerning their securities. 135 The unfortunate truth
revealed by the Great Depression was that many of these representations were false,
leading to an environment in which investors could not trust a seller's, or a
company's, statements. Congress sought to address, and correct, this distrustflil
environment by enacting federal laws requiring honest disclosure to investors.
Congress took several significant steps to restore investors' trust in statements
made by companies. Most importantly, numerous anti-fraud provisions were
133 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
134 President Roosevelt, in urging congressional action, noted that the enactment of federal
securities laws was necessary to "bring back public confidence." Messagefrom the President-
Regulation of Security Issues, 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) [hereinafter Message from the
President]. The legislative history ofthe federal securities laws indicates that Congress agreed that
this was an important objective of the federal securities laws. See S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933)
(stating that "[c]onfidence must and may be restored upon the enduring basis of honesty with the
public!).
135 See S. Rap. No. 7347, at 2 (1933) (noting that "billions of dollars" of securities were sold
through "incomplete, careless, or false representations"); H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933)
(criticizing that sellers often made "[a]lluring promises of easy wealth").
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included in the federal securities laws.136 The SEC was established to enforce these
provisions.' 37 Moreover, investors were authorized to bring private actions to
enforce the anti-fraud provisions.138
Lawmakers justified the additional regulation and exposure to liability that
would be imposed by the federal securities laws by reasoning that a company owes
special duties to its investors. For example, President Roosevelt explained that the
federal securities laws should lead to "a return to a clearer understanding of the
ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies
handling or using other people's money are trustees acting for others."' 39 This
recognition that a company has a special, almost fiduciary, relationship with its
investors appears throughout the legislative history of the federal securities laws.
In enacting the Securities Act of 1933, Congress returned again and again to the
theme that those who sell securities to the public act as trustees. For example, in the
Senate Report, the special position of trust held by a company's directors was used
by Congress to explain the imposition of civil liability for a false or misleading
statement appearing in a registration statement,140 even though the directors may
have acted without scienter. 141 Congress reasoned that "he should suffer the loss
136 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (false or misleading
statements in a registration statement); Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2)
(1994) (false or misleading statements in a prospectus or oral communication); Securities Act of
1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994) (false or misleading statements made in offer or sale of
securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) (false or
misleading statements made in connection with a tender offer); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1994) (false or misleading statements in documents filed with the
SEC).
In addition, the SEC exercised the authority delegated by Congress to promulgate additional
anti-fraud rules. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998)
(false or misleading statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-9 (1998) (false or misleading
statements appearing in proxy solicitation materials).
137 The SEC was created as part of the original enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994). For a discussion of the
SEC's enforcement powers, see HAZEN, supra note 32, § 9.5, at 420.
138 See supra note 4.
139 Messagefrom the President, supra note 134.
140 In general, the Securities Act of 1933 requires that an issuer desiring to sell securities to
the public must disclose certain information in a registration statement, a specific type of disclosure
document. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1994). Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for false or misleading statements appearing in that
registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
141 Section 11 ofthe Securities Act of 1933 does not contain a scienterrequirement. Instead,
civil liability for non-issuer defendants may be imposed for negligent behavior. See Securities Act
of 1933 § I1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994). An issuer is strictly liable for material
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who occupies a position of trust in the issuing corporation toward the stockholders,
rather than the buyer of stock who must rely on what he is told."142
The importance of the relationship between the company and the investing
public was also emphasized in the House Report, which dedicates an entire section
to a discussion of trusteeship.143 The drafters, in addressing the imposition of civil
liability under the Securities Act of 1933, explained:
[The] essential characteristic [of civil liability] consists of a requirement that all
those responsible for statements upon the face of which the public is solicited to
invest its money shall be held to standards like those imposed by law upon a
fiduciary. Honesty, care, and competence are the demands of trusteeship. 144
The recognition that a company has special responsibilities to its investors is
not limited to situations in which a company is selling its securities. The theme re-
appears in the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The House
Report contains a thoughtful discussion of the duties owed under the federal
securities laws. The Report states:
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and corporations
alike, the law must advance. As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates the
financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to trst others and cannot
personally watch the managers of all his interests as one horse trader watches
another, it becomes a condition of the very stability of that society that its rles of
law and of business practice recognize and protect that ordinary citizen's dependent
position. Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary
relationship... supports the constant extension of mutual confidence which is the
foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system, easy liquidity of the
resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to the stability
of that system. 145
As the legislative history of the federal securities laws makes clear, Congress
intended to hold companies to a fiduciary-like standard of conduct. In particular,
Congress intended that companies should make honest disclosure and that investors
should be entitled to believe this disclosure. The puffery defense, however,
undercuts this policy. If courts continue to apply the puffery defense, investors will
be forced to question the veracity of a company's optimistic statements, leading to
misrepresentations appearing in its registration statement. See id
142 S. REP. No. 73-47, at 5 (1933).
143 Section 1.6 ofthe House Report is entitled '"The Imposition of Standards of Trusteeship."
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
144 Id 
.145 H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934).
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a distrustful investment environment based on the doctrine of caveat emptor. Such
a result conflicts with one of the fundamental objectives of the federal securities
laws.
This conclusion was recognized in Anschutz Corp. v. Kay Corp.146 In that case,
Anschutz Corp. (Anschutz) purchased from Kay Corp. (Kay) an interest in a mining
corporation. 147 During the negotiations, Kay stated the mine was worth two million
dollars.148 This valuation was inaccurate.149 Anschutz brought suit under the federal
securities laws, and Kay contended that its statement constituted non-actionable
puffery.'50 Kay relied primarily on Judge Learned Hand's classic statement
concerning puffery contained in Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Manufacturing Co.:
The reason of the rule [of puffery] lies, we think, in this: There are some kinds of
talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and if he does he suffers from his
credulity. If we were all scrupulously honest, it would not be so; but as it is, neither
party usually believes what the seller says about his own opinions, and each knows
it.151
The Anschutz court rejected this reasoning. Noting that Vulcan Metals was
decided prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws, the district court
questioned whether Judge Learned Hand's analysis continued to be valid.152 The
district court stated: "[W]e strongly doubt whether Judge Hand would have adopted
the same approach today in view of the heightened standards of disclosure
established by the federal securities laws enacted fifteen and sixteen years after the
Vulcan decision."'153 Because the district court recognized that puffery was in
conflict with the policies underlying the federal securities laws, it refused to apply
the puffery defense. Other courts should do the same.
V. THE CouRTS HAVE ERRONEOUSLY SUBSTITUTED THE PUFFERY
DEFENSE FOR A MATERIALITY ANALYSIS
When a court uses the puffery defense to dismiss an action brought under the
federal securities laws, it has presumably concluded that the company's statement
146 507 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).




151 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918), quoted in Anschutz, 507 F. Supp. at 74.




was immaterial as a matter of law.154 However, a close examination of the cases
shows that most courts have not in fact conducted a materiality analysis. Instead,
they have relied almost exclusively on the words of the company's statement, while
ignoring other factors that might lead a reasonable investor to conclude that the
statement was important to the investment decision. In effect, the courts have
erroneously substituted the puffery defense for a proper materiality analysis.
A. The Puffery Defense Fails To Consider the Importance of the Context
of the Statement to the Materiality Determination
As discussed above,155 a statement is material "if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider [the information] important
in deciding how to [act].'1 56 The materiality of a statement cannot be assessed by
examining the statement in isolation. Only by examining the surrounding
circumstances can a court determine whether the statement would assume
significance to a reasonable investor.
The recognition that materiality is relative, or contextual, in nature can be seen
in the cases adopting the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. The bespeaks caution
doctrine provides that a prediction, forecast, or other type of forward-looking
statement is immaterial as a matter of law if it is accompanied by sufficient
cautionary language. 157 For example, assume that a court is determining the
materiality of a company's statement that its new product will be introduced in the
next year. In assessing materiality, the court will not look only at the statement The
court will also examine any cautionary lafiguage accompanying the statement that
discloses the risk that the forward-looking statement may not come true. As the
Third Circuit explained:
[M]ateriality is a relative concept, so that a court must appraise a misrepresentation
or omission in the complete context in which the author conveys it In other words,
a particular misrepresentation or omission significant to a reasonable investor in one
154 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
155 Seesupra note 17 and accompanying text.
156 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
157 See In re Donald J. Trump Casino See. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F3d 357,371 (3d Cir.
1993). The courts have also reasoned that the bespeaks caution doctrine protects a defendant from
liability because the cautionary language prevents reasonable reliance on the defendant's forward-
looking statements and prevents the forward-looking statement from becoming false or misleading.
See Langevoort, supra note 14, at 487 (explaining why "cautionary language can cause
dismissal'). For an in-depth discussion of the different rationales explaining why cautionary
language may operate to protect a defendant from liability under the federal securities laws, see
Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State ofMind,
58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 619,630-38 (1997).
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document or circumstance may not influence a reasonable investor in another.158
Thus, courts should assess the materiality of a statement by reference to its
surrounding circumstances.
The materiality of a company's vague statement of corporate optimism should
not be assessed merely by examining the words of that statement. Yet that is
precisely what most courts have done.159 For example, in Hillson Partners Ltd.
Partnership v. Adage, Inc.,160 a company stated that it was "on target toward
achieving the most profitable year in its history" 161 and that its operations "should
significantly improve.' 1 62 In determining that these statements constituted puffery,
the court limited its analysis to the statements themselves. After examining the
company's language, the court determined that these statements were too "vague"
to be material. 163 According to the ourt, then, the statements constituted immaterial
puffery.164
Certainly these statements were vague, and, taken in isolation, perhaps a
reasonable investor would not place much significance on them. However, there
were surrounding circumstances that might have led a reasonable investor to come
to a different conclusion. Specifically, these statements were made in the company's
quarterly reports filed with the SEC.165 This factor might have led a reasonable
158 Ta MahalLifig., 7 F.3d at 369 (citations omitted); accord Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120
F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the bespeaks caution doctrine "stands for the
'unremarkable proposition that statements must be analyzed in context"') (quoting Rubinstein v.
Collins, 20 F3d 160,167 (5th Cir. 1994)); In re Worlds ofWonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414
(9th Cir. 1994) (same).
159 A few courts have recognized that context plays a role in determining whether a
company's statement constitutes puffery. See Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 331 (4th Cir.
1992) (stating that "[w]e agree that the atmosphere in which statements are made may bear on their
materiality'); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[w]hat might be
innocuous 'puffery' or mere statement of opinion standing alone may be actionable as an integral
part of a representation of material fact when used to emphasize and induce reliance upon such a
representation"); Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 428 (DRI.
1996) (recognizing that the context in which a statement was made may 'lead an investor to
downplay" the significance of the statement); Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298,
1313 (D.N.H. 1996) (stating that "the court will not dismiss a complaint on vagueness grounds if
the alleged statements are such that, given the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable investor
may have relied on the statements and predictions").
160 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).







investor to place some significance on these statements, despite their vagueness. 166
The investor would have known that the statements were made in a formal written
document and that the document was prepared after careful deliberation.
Furthermore, the investor would have known that statements appearing in a
document filed with the SEC create the potential for significant liability under the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Therefore, it would seem that a
reasonable investor could have found these statements to be significant despite their
vagueness.
The Hillson court did not recognize this. The court limited its examination to
the statement itself and thereby failed to see that the context of the statement
transformed a promotional, perhaps unimportant, statement into one that a
reasonable investor could have found to be significant Essentially, the court took
an impermissible shortcut. By looking only at the vagueness of the language and
ignoring its context, the court failed to conduct a full materiality analysis.
Naturally, the effect of context on the materiality determination cuts both ways.
Just as the surrounding circumstances may lead a reasonable investor to attach more
significance to a company's statement, the surrounding circumstances may also lead
a reasonable investor to attach less significance to a company's statement. To date,
the courts have not recognized that context may lead to a determination that a
company's vague statement is nonetheless material. However, a few courts have
used the statement's context as additional support for their holdings that the vague
statement was immaterial as a matter of law. 167
For example, in Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp.,168 a company
stated that it recognized the "significance of newly emerging international markets
and the vast potential for [its] products in these areas of the world."1 69 The company
failed to disclose, however, that it had discovered a component defect in some of its
products that would significantly affect its international operations. 170 When the
company finally disclosed the defect, the stock price fell, 171 and investors brought
166 See Schneider, supra note 57, at 258 (noting that "[i]nvestors assume, with a great deal
of'justification, that information appearing in SEC filings has been prepared with considerable
care, tending to assure its accuracy").
167 See Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that because the
statements were made while the company official and the investor were playing golf, it was less
likely that the statements were material); Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F.
Supp. 416,428 (D.R.I. 1996) (noting that because the statements were made in connection with
a promotional press release, it was less likely that the statement was material).
168 945 F. Supp. at 428.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 423.171 See id. at 420.
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suit, claiming that the company's statement was materially misleading.172 The court
first reviewed the language of the company's statement and held that it constituted
puffery.173 Then the court examined the context of the company's statement Noting
that the statement was made in a press release announcing the appointment of a new
president for Worldwide Business Development, the court reasoned that the
promotional context of the statement would lead a reasonable investor to discount
its significance. 174 Thus, the context of the statement was further support for the
court's holding that the company's statement was immaterial as a matter of law.
In addition to failing to recognize that where a company's statement was made
might be important to a reasonable investor, the courts have failed to place any
importance on who made the statement. Some courts have not drawn a distinction
between statements made by brokers and statements made by non-brokers. 175 In
Voit v. Wonderware Corp.,1 76 for example, a company stated that its newly-hired
president was "really looking forward to working with" 177 the company's existing
Chief Executive Officer. Soon after, the company's CEO was replaced by the new
president, and the company explained that the CEO's departure was part of a
planned strategy. 178 Investors brought suit, contending that the company's original
statement was a material misrepresentation. 179 In analyzing whether the company's
statement constituted puffery, the court relied on several puffery cases involving
statements made by brokers.180 Thus, the court did not appear to attach any
significance to the identity of the speaker.181 The court looked only at the language
of the statement and ignored the identity of the speaker.
The identity of the speaker would seem to be a factor that a reasonable investor
would consider in determining whether the statement was important. Certainly, a
reasonable investor would place greater significance on a statement made by a
172 See id at 420-21.
173 See id. at 428.
174 See id.
175 See Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992) (relying on puffery cases
involving brokers in assessing whether a statement made by a director constituted puffery); Voit
v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (relying on puffery cases involving
brokers in assessing whether a statement made by a company constituted puffery); In re Apple
Computer Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1572 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
176 977 F. Supp. at 363.
177 Id. at 365.
178 See id. at 366.
179 See id. at 367.
180 See id at 370 (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990)
and Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
181 The Voit court ultimately determined that the company's statement did not constitute
puffery because the company's statement was not an "exaggerated sales pitch[ ]." Id
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company than on a statement made by a broker. The investor is well aware that the
company, through its officers and directors, owes fiduciary duties to its investors.
On the other hand, a reasonable investor might be more likely to discount a
statement made by a broker, who is trying to make a sale.18 2
Similarly, the courts have not drawn any distinction between statements made
by a company through its officers or directors and statements made by an analyst 83
who purports to report statements made by the company.184 Because there is a
danger that an analyst may have misheard or misunderstood the company's
statement, or that the analyst may have failed to communicate the company's
statement properly, a statement reported by an analyst may be less reliable than a
statement made directly by the company. Therefore, investors may attach less
significance to such statements. Thus, by ignoring the significance of the speaker
and focusing only on the vagueness of the company's statement, the courts have
failed to conduct a materiality analysis.
B. The Unique Nature of Statements Characterizing Present Facts Should
Affect the Materiality Determination
In using the puffery defense to dismiss securities fraud actions, many courts
have failed to attach any significance to the type of statement made by a company.
Specifically, these courts see no difference between a vague forward-looking
statement, such as a statement that the company expects to see "strong" earnings in
the following quarter, and a vague statement characterizing present facts, such as
a statement that demand for its product during the previous quarter was "strong."
18 2 A broker may also owe fiduciary duties to his client, although the law is far from clear.
General agency principles impose fiduciary duties on a broker acting as an agent. In addition,
under certain circumstances, the federal securities laws may impose certain fiduciary duties upon
a broker acting as a principal (i.e., as a dealer). For an overview of the fiduciary duties owed by
brokers to their clients, see 8 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3816-39.
183 A company may be liable for statements made by analysts if the company has
"sufficiently entangled itself with the analysts' [statements] to render those [statements] attributable
to it." Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a discussion of the entanglement theory, see Robert Norman Sobol, Comment, The
Tangled Web ofIssuer Liabilityfor Analyst Statements: In re Cims Logic Securities Litigation,
22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1051, 1063-66 (1997).
184 Although several puffery cases involved statements made by a company to analysts that
were later reported to investors, none of these cases addressed whether the identity of the speaker
was a factor in determining materiality. See In re Burlington Coat Factory See. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1428 (3d Cir. 1997) (statements made by company during conference with analysts were
reported by Reuters); Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1310-12 (D.N.H. 1996)
(statements made by company during conference calls with analysts reported to investors in
analyst reports).
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According to these courts,185 a vague statement is a vague statement, and all vague
statements constitute puffery. 186 These courts have failed to recognize that a
reasonable investor might find a statement characterizing present facts to be
significant even if the statement is vague. Because the puffery defense focuses only
on the language of the statement, courts applying the puffery defense have failed to
attach any importance to the unique nature of statements characterizing present
facts.
This faulty approach can be seen in Grossman v. Novell, Inc.187 In Grossman,
Novell, Inc. ("Novell") merged with WordPerfect Corp. ("WordPerfect"). 188 Prior
to the merger, there had been some concern that the integration of the two
companies might be difficult.189 Following the merger, Novell, the surviving
corporation, stated that "Novell had experienced substantial success in the
integration" 190 of the two sales forces, that the merger process had moved "faster
than we thought it would,"191 and that the Novell-WordPerfect merger had been
"perhaps the smoothest of mergers in recent history."'192 Following these
statements, Novell disclosed disappointing quarterly earnings, and investors brought
suit, contending that these statements constituted material misrepresentations. 193
185 See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
statement characterizing a prior merger as "success[ful]" was too vague to be material); Eisenstadt
v. Centel Corp., 113 F3d 738, 741,745 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that statement characterizing an
on-going auction of the company as going "very well" and "very smoothly" was too general to be
material); Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 995 (lst Cir. 1996) (holding statement
characterizing the company's receipt of orders for its product as "significant" to be too vague to
be material); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding statements
characterizing the company's prior transition to selling anew kind of product as "going reasonably
well" and the company's financial status as "healthy" to be immaterial); In re Stratosphere Corp.
See. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1118 (D. Nev. 1998) (holding statement characterizing the opening
of the company's new hotel as going "very smoothly" to be too general to be material); In re
Healthco Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 777 F. Supp. 109, 115 (D. Mass. 1991) (finding statement
characterizing the status of a merger too vague to be material); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.,
672 F. Supp. 1552, 1572 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding statement characterizing the company's
personal computer as "clearly being recognized as an important force in the office market" to be
too emphatic to be material).
186 For a criticism of this approach and an argument that a court should also consider the
context of the statement, see supra Part V.A.
187 120F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997).
188 See id at 1116.
1 8 9 See id.
190 Id. at 1117.
191 d.
192 Id
193 See id. at 1116.
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Novell argued that these statements were immaterial, and the district court
agreed. 194 The Tenth Circuit affirmed. 195
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the puffery defense, noting that "[s]tatements
classified as 'corporate optimism' or 'mere puffing' are typically forward-looking
statements, or are generalized statements of optimism that are not capable of
objective verification." 196 It emphasized that certain statements are immaterial as
a matter of law because they are too vague to be found significant by a reasonable
investor.197 Alter examining Novell's statements, the court concluded that "[t]hese
are the sort of soft, puffing statements, incapable of objective verification, that
courts routinely dismiss as vague statements of corporate optimism."'1 98
The Novell court, therefore, did not find it at all significant that Novell's
statements were not forward-looking, but were rather statements characterizing
present facts--the success of the merger. In other words, Novell was not predicting
the effect of afuture merger;, it was evaluating the success of an already completed
merger. According to the court, the distinction was not important Because Novell's
statements were too vague, no reasonable investor would consider them significant
It is true that each of Novell's statements was vague. Nonetheless, a reasonable
investor might have found the information to be important. A reasonable investor
would place greater significance on a statement characterizing present facts than on
a statement predicting future performance. Investors understand that forward-
looking statements are inherently unreliable. Forward-looking statements almost
always turn out to be wrong because they are based on estimates and assumptions.
A statement characterizing present facts, on the other hand, is based on historical
data. Therefore, it is more likely to be accurate. 199 Thus, even though a statement
characterizing present facts may be vague, a reasonable investor would understand
it to rest on historical information and might find it to be significant.
The Novell court failed to recognize this. Because it launched directly into a
discussion of the puffery defense, the court was swayed by the vagueness of the
company's statements. It did not attach any importance to the type of statement
Novell made. If it had, it would have realized that a reasonable investor might attach
significance to Novell's statements, despite their vagueness. By failing to draw a
194 Seeid at 1117.
195 See id at 1126.
196 Id at 1119.
197 See id at 1119-20.
198 Id at 1121-22.
199 As one commentator has pointed out: "he reliability of a statement of past events (i.e.,
the correlation of the information contained in the statement with the events it describes) is apt to
be greater than the reliability of a statement of future or contingent events.' Victor Brudney,. A
Note on Materiality and Soft Info rmation under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723,
729 (1989).
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distinction between forward-looking statements and statements characterizing
present facts, it impermissibly bypassed the materiality analysis. Rather than asking
whether a reasonable investor might find the statement to be important, it simply
asked whether the statement was too vague. This is not a proper materiality analysis.
Although most courts have overlooked the important distinction between
forward-looking statements and characterizations of present facts, a few courts have
recognized its relevance to the materiality analysis 00 A good example isMcCarthy
v. C-Cor Electronics, Inc.20 1 In McCarthy, a company stated that it was expecting
"strong" quarterly revenues 02 The company argued that this statement constituted
puffery.20 3 The court agreed that the company's statement was vague, but
determined that vagueness alone was not dispositive to materiality.204 Instead, the
court emphasized the significance of the forward-looking nature of the company's
statement to the materiality determination. The court drew a clear distinction
between forward-looking statements and statements characterizing present facts,
concluding that "[fiorward-looking statements are.., less material than are
statements of present fact."2 05 According to the court, reasonable investors do not
place as much significance on forward-looking statements because they "know that
prediction is necessarily an inexact art, and so treat forward-looking statements as
less reliable than statements about present facts."206 The court noted that a similarly
vague statement "that focused on the present, rather than the future, would certainly
be material. '20 7
As the above discussion demonstrates, many courts have failed to recognize
that the special nature of statements characterizing present facts may lead
reasonable investors to attach significance to them, despite their vagueness. There
is another reason why courts should not automatically attach a puffery label to a
vague statement characterizing present facts: Statements characterizing present facts
200 See Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204,211 (4th Cir. 1994)
(distinguishing between "expressions of belief or opinion 'concerning current facts,' that 'may be
material"' and "opinions as to uncertain fixture events" that may not be material) (quoting Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090-97 (1991)); Raab v. General Physics Corp.,
4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between "expressions of belief or opinion
concerning current facts" that may be material and "[p]redictions of future growth" that may not
be material); McCarthy v. C-Cor Elec., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 970, 976-77 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(distinguishing between forward-looking statements and statements of present fact).
201 909 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
2 02 See id. at 974-75.
2 03 See id at 976.
204 See id. at 977.





are necessarily vague. When a company evaluates an on-going transaction or its past
financial performance, it will examine the relevant facts, analyze them, and then
distill them into a general statement For example, when a company is asked to
describe its present financial health, it could respond with a simple dollars and cents
statement of earnings, allowing its audience to draw their own conclusions.
However, the information the market really wants to know is the company's own
assessment of its health (i.e., Is the company's condition "strong?" 'Fair?"
"Improving?"). Similarly, when a company is asked to comment on the status of its
attempt to acquire another company, for example, its response may be that the
transaction is proceeding "very well," "well," or perhaps "not so well." All of these
evaluative words are sufficiently vague to be labeled puffery. However, such a
result would mean that a company's statement characterizing present facts would
always be immaterial and therefore non-actionable. Courts should recognize, then,
that the vagueness of a statement characterizing present facts should not be
dispositive to a materiality determination.
The Supreme Court has buttressed the conclusion that a company's statement
characterizing present facts, though vague, may nonetheless be material. In Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,20 8 the board of directors of a bank stated that they
approved a merger because it presented the minority shareholders with an
opportunity to receive a "high" value for their stock 209 The board also stated that
the proposed price for the minority shareholders's stock was "fair."210 The bank
argued that these statements were too "indefinite" and too "unverifiable" to be
actionable under the federal securities laws.211 The Supreme Court disagreed.2 12
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a discussion of whether statements
of opinion or belief can ever be material. 213 The Court simply stated that "no serious
question' 214 could be raised that such statements could be material. In the section
of its opinion addressing materiality,2 15 the Court did not directly discuss the effect
of vagueness on the materiality determination. Instead, it merely agreed that the jury
hearing the Virginia Bankshares case could have found that the bank's statements
were material.216 Therefore, the Court indicated that the vagueness of the bank's
208 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
20 9 See id. at 1088.
210 See id.
2 11 See id. at 1090.
212 See id. at 1093.213 See id. at 1090.
214 Il
2 15 Part 11-A ofthe Virginia Bankshares opinion addresses materiality. See id.
216 The Supreme Court noted that "the shareowner faced with a proxy request will think it
important to know the directors' beliefs about the course they recommend and their specific
reasons for urging the stockholders to embrace it." Id. at 1091.
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statements did not lead automatically to a conclusion that the statements were
immaterial. In other words, the Supreme Court appears to have rejected the
argument that vague statements characterizing present facts are always immaterial
as a matter of law.217
The Supreme Court did directly address the significance of vagueness in
another section of the Virginia Bankshares opinion. After discussing whether the
bank's statements were material, the Court turned to the question of whether the
bank's statements were factual.2 1 8 The bank had argued that the statements were too
vague to constitute facts. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
It is no answer to argue... that the quoted statement on which liability was
predicated did not express a reason in dollars and cents, but focused instead on the
"indefinite and unverifiable" term, "high" value, much like the similar claim that
the merger's terms were "fair" to shareholders. The objection ignores the fact that
such conclusory terms in a commercial context are reasonably understood to rest
on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate .... 2 19
Because this discussion focused on whether vague statements constituted facts,
as opposed to whether such statements were material, this portion of the opinion
did not directly stand for the proposition that a vague statement characterizing
present facts is material. However, the opinion clearly demonstrates that the
Supreme Court does recognize that vague statements may be important to
investors.
VI. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE MATERIALTY OF
VAGUE STATEMENTS OF CORPORATE OPTIMISM
So what should a court do when it is confronted with a vague statement of
corporate optimism? As I demonstrated in the previous sections of this Article, the
217 Several courts have read Virginia Bankshares as standing for the proposition that vague
statements characterizing present facts can be material. See Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d
272, 282 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that Virginia Bankshares supported the court's holding that a
company's characterizations of management practices as "adequate," "conservative," and
"cautious" were actionable); McCarthy v. C-Cor Elec., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 970,976 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(stating that the "adjective 'strong' is no less specific than the adjectives at issue in Virginia
Bankshares, in which the [Supreme] Court found that statements that a merger offered a 'high'
value at a 'fair' price were material").
21 8 Part II.B.1 of the Virginia Bankshares opinion addresses whether vague statements can
be factual. See id at 1091. Because it begins with the Supreme Court assuming the materiality of
the bank's statements, the Supreme Court makes clear that it is not addressing materiality in this
section of its opinion. See id.
219 Id. at 1093.
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court should not simply review the language of the statement, label the statement
as puffery, and dismiss the action as a matter of law.220 Instead, the courts should
conduct a full materiality analysis by examining both the statement itself and the
context in which the statement was made. This section of the Article attempts to
provide the courts with a framework for addressing the materiality of vague
company statements.
When a court is asked to determine the materiality of a vague statement of
corporate optimism, it should consider the following factors: (1) the vagueness of
the statement; (2) whether the statement is a forward-looking statement or a
statement characterizing present facts; and (3) the presence or absence of any other
factors that may lead a reasonable investor to find the company's statement to be
significant to an investment decision.
Vagueness of the Statement: As shown above,221 the courts should not limit
their analysis to the language of the statement. Nonetheless, the vagueness of a
statement is a significant factor in determining materiality. The more vague the
statement, the less likely it is that a reasonable investor would find it important.
Therefore, it is less likely to be material. However, vagueness is not dispositive.
Instead, it is merely one of several factors that a court needs to consider in its
materiality determination.222
Type of Statement: In addition to the vagueness of the statement, the court
should consider whether the statement of corporate optimism is a forward-looking
statement or a statement characterizing present facts. As discussed above,223 there
is an important distinction between the two types of statements. Because forward-
looking statements are understood to be somewhat unreliable, reasonable investors
are less likely to find such statements to be significant.224 However, courts should
not always hold that vague forward-looking statements are immaterial as a matter
of law. Rather, the courts should scrutinize the forward-looking statement to
determine how unreliable it is. Certain forward-looking statements are more reliable
than others. For example, the court should consider the timeframe of the
prediction.225 A prediction of company earnings expected at the end of the next
quarter is more reliable than a prediction of company earnings expected at the end
of the next year. Thus, a reasonable investor might attach more significance to the
first prediction than the second. In assessing the materiality of a vague forward-
looking statement, then, a court should examine the statement to determine if a
2 20 See supra Part V.
221 See supra Part V.
2 22 See supra Part V.A.
223 See supra Part V.B.
2 24 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
225 See McCarthy v. C-Cor Elec., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 970,977 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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reasonable investor would find the forward-looking statement to be reliable and
therefore significant to an investment decision.
A statement characterizing present facts should be held immaterial as a matter
of law only in very rare circumstances. Because statements characterizing present
facts are based on historical facts, they are more likely to be reliable, and reasonable
investors are more likely to attach significance to such statements. 226 Moreover,
when a court is asked to consider the materiality of a statement characterizing
present facts, it should recognize that assessments and evaluations of present facts
are necessarily vague.227 Therefore, in assessing the materiality of a statement
characterizing present facts, the courts should place much less emphasis on the
statement's vagueness.
Identifying the company's vague statement as a statement characterizing
present facts will not always lead to a determination that the statement is not
immaterial as a matter of law. However, it would seem that courts should normally
allow the determination to be made by ajury. Only if the surrounding circumstances
undeniably lead to a conclusion that a reasonable investor would attach no
importance to the statement should a court find the statement to be immaterial as a
matter of law.
Other Factors Affecting Significance to Investor: Finally, the court should
consider the presence or absence of any other factors that might lead a reasonable
investor to attach significance to the company's vague statement of corporate
optimism. An important factor to consider is where the statement was made. If the
statement was made in a document filed with the SEC, a reasonable investor might
find a vague statement to be significant despite its vagueness.228 On the other hand,
if the statement was made orally, in a casual setting, a reasonable investor would
probably not attach much significance to a vague statement of corporate
optimism.2
29
The court should also consider if the statement was made in a promotional
setting. If so, investors would be more likely to understand that the company's
statement may be somewhat exaggerated and may therefore place less importance
on it. For example, if a company's vague statement is connected with the launch of
a new product a reasonable investor is likely to discount the company's statement
as product "hype."230 Similarly, if the company's vague statement of corporate
optimism is made in the "Chairman's Letter" to investors that appears in the
226 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
227 See supra Part V.B.
228 See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
230 For a discussion of the promotion that ordinarily accompanies an introduction of a new
product, see Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and
the Securities Fraud Liability ofHigh-Tech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4-16 (1994).
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company's annual report that is sent to shareholders, 231 then a reasonable investor
may place less importance on it. The annual report that is sent to shareholders is a
glossy, promotional document and investors understand that statements made in the
Chairman's Letter are often exaggerated. 232 For example, following an extensive
review of annual reports, a business journalist observed:
Sameness is apparent from the outset, as most opening statements employ
superlatives: "We're the leading provider of.. ." or"... the dominant force in...
Every one of the annual reports from long-distance companies said "we're" the
leader in the field. And one chairman after another reported the completion of yet
another "record year"--including heads of two companies whose major financial
indicators, depicted later in the report, had all declined from the previous year.233
The courts should also consider the identity of the speaker.234 Investors would
most likely attach greater significance to statements made by a company's officer
or director than to statements made by other representatives of the company, such
as spokespersons, or to statements made indirectly by the company through
231 The annual report that is sent to shareholders is distinguishable from a company's
"Annual Report on Form 10-I' that must be filed with the SEC. The annual report that is sent to
shareholders contains a summary of the information required to be disclosed in the company's 10-
K. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1998) (listing
the information that must be disclosed in an annual report to security holders). It is also "glossier"
than the more formal document that is filed with the SEC. For a discussion of the annual report,
see HAZEN, supra note 32, § 11.6, at 588-89.
232 The promotional nature of the Chairman's Letter to investors is well recognized. See
David Robinson, From the Desk Of. Annual Reports, RIP., N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998, at C13
(recognizing the Chairman's Letter as "usually full of self-congratulation"); Sana Siwolop,
Investing It. Annual Report Mantra: New! Improved!, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, at C4 (noting
that "the glossy missives that companies send shareholders each year have long tended to play up
efforts to become sleeker, more cost-conscious and more profitable"); Sana Siwolop, Investing It:
Painting the Year That Was, or Will Be, N.Y. TMEs, Apr. 27, 1997, at C4 (characterizing the
Chairman's Letter to investors as "breezy"); David Stauffer, Manager's Journal: What Annual
Reports Won't Say, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1997, at A14 (noting that annual reports "try[ ] to give
a rosy glow to lackluster corporate performance").
233 Stauffer, supra note 232, at A14. In a humorous article, Mr. Stauffer"translates" a typical
annual report, distinguishing between what actually happened to the company and how it is
presented in the annual report. For example:
-[What happened:] By just about every measure of corporate performance, the company
now ranks at or near the bottom for its industry.
How it's described: 'We are well-positioned for future growth."
Id
234 See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
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analysts.2 35 In addition, investors might find certain types of speakers to be more
important than others. For example, a statement made by a company officer who
does not ordinarily make public statements may be considered to be quite important
to investors, simply because of its rarity.2 36
This proposed fi-amework will assist courts in making a reasoned materiality
determination. If courts continue to apply the puffery defense, which focuses simply
on the language of the company's vague statement of corporate optimism, courts
risk dismissing meritorious actions as a matter of law. However, if courts apply the
proposed fi-amework, they may well determine that a reasonable investor could find
the company's statement of corporate optimism to be material, despite its
vagueness, and therefore allow the claim to proceed to the jury. The jury will then
be able to capitalize on its particular strengths to determine whether the company's
statement was material or not.
The proposed fiamework will allow potentially meritorious actions to continue
without creating a risk of increased strike suits. Courts applying the proposed
framework can, and should, continue to dismiss clearly immaterial actions as a
matter of law. The proposed fiamework simply refocuses the court's attention on
its true task-assessing the materiality of a company's statement. It reminds the
court that it must examine all circumstances that might lead an investor to attach
significance to a company's statement. Only when courts apply the proposed
framework will the puffery defense be relegated back to its proper extinct status.
2 35 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, The Markets. Value ofSpin on Wall Street Is $15 Billion
to 2 Companies, N.Y. TOMES, May 15, 1998, at DI (noting that the chairman of IBM only speaks
to analysts once a year).
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